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Music and Law: Copyrighting a Musical Idea
Irving B. Marks* and Robert M. Phillips**

W

HEN COMPARED

TO OTHER ASPECTS

of jurisprudence, the laws of

copyright in general, and of musical copyright in particular, are
relatively new and still floundering in the quagmire of evolution. As
early as 550 B.C., poets and musicians (the terms were for all practical
1
purposes synonymous in those days ) recognized some gain for their
2
labors in composing, writing, and performing. In fact, one of the first of
this breed was Simonides of Ceos (556-448 B.C.), the poet laureate of
his day, who frankly avowed that his purpose in writing was to be
recompensed in gold. 3 However, it was not until much later that any
thought was given as to whether the songs or poems were the performer's own, or whether he had simply gathered up bits and pieces from
other tunes and odes, put them together, and passed them off in performance as his original work.
Probably the first such distinction as to originality in this area came
about when Ptolemy Evergetes, who ruled Egypt around 195 B.C., held
competitions for original works and songs, and awarded prizes to those
4
whose pieces were considered the best. During the course of one of
such competitions, Aristophanes, one of seven judges, selected an unpopular winner because he was the only one with an original composition. All the others had borrowed, at least in part, some of their
compositions from other writers, and they were condemned as plagiarists
by him.5 But as to our present day concept of copyright, many consider
the direct ancestor to be the Roman Law, and in particular the law of
the period of Gaius (110-180 A.D.).6
At that time they wrestled with the problem of who owned a particular manuscript; the writer who had affixed his initials thereto, or the
owner of the manuscript? They concluded that the owner was the one
who was the lawful possessor, but the writer was to be compensated for
7
his work.
* B.S., Ohio State Univ.; Third-year student at Cleveland-Marshall College of Law,
Cleveland State Univ.; law clerk for the Legal Aid Society.
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1 Shafter, Musical Copyright 3 (1939).
2 Ibid. at 4.
3 Id. at 7. For an interesting modern analogy, urging scholars to write for money,
and showing them how to do so, see, Oleck, Research and Writing for the Professional Market: The Financial Aspects, 19 J. Legal Educ. (3) 325 (1967).
4 Id. at 10.
5 Id.
6 Lolinger, Evolution of the Roman Law 17 (1923).
7 Ibid.
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From this point, the evolutionary process of copyright moved
sporadically through the years until the advent of the Gutenberg printing press in 1440.8 This invention, of course, revolutionized the recording of all writings, and by 1491, the Republic of Venice had issued the
first copyright protection ever granted by law.9 It is interesting to note,
however, that this protection was extended to the printers and not to the
authors.10 The temptation to comment bitterly about the continuing
tendencies to protect the businessman rather than the artist must be
repressed.
The normal processes then carried the copyright law through
Europe, England, and finally America." However, it was not until the
Copyright Act of 1831 that music was mentioned as a subject for copy2
right.1

Why was there this initial gap in distinguishing poems, plays, and
art work as subjects of copyright, and musical compositions as not? The
answer is simple. To be properly capable of legislating policies in order
to govern, and for tribunals to adjudicate musical controversies, those
persons doing the enacting and adjudicating must be well grounded in
the rudiments of music.
Music always has been a highly technical profession, and as such,
has been relegated to a back seat when it confronted the legislatures and
jurists who had little or no formal background in the subject. This is
not to advocate formal training in order to make an individual able to
enjoy a Beethoven Sonata, or a waltz by Strauss. However, this is to
advocate that some formalized schooling is required in order to determine when, in an infringement suit, a defendant performer actually has
developed a melody line through improvisation that in no way resembles
plaintiff composer's melody line, but which in fact is based on plaintiff
composer's own chordal structure. In other words, some understanding
of chord inversions, use of chromatics, and of tonic, dominant and subdominant chords, resolutions, et al. is necessary.
Earlier, above, we mentioned a "gap" between the development of
the copyright law dealing with music and the copyright law dealing with
other subjects of copyright; i.e., with books, graphic art, and plays. To
date, the only means available to copyright a piece of music is by submitting a notated manuscript. 13 The court invariably hangs its hat on
the words "visible notation." 14 This particular thinking is derived from
8 Supra note 1, at 16.
9 Ibid.
10

Id.

11 Id. at 26.
12 Id.
13 Id. at 84.
14 37 Code of Federal Regulations (Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights) Sec. 202.8

(a) (1959).

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol18/iss3/13

2

MUSIC AND LAW

the earlier strict interpretations of the Federal Constitution, which
required that, in order to protect the rights of authors, their works must
be in "writing." 15 However, does not the mechanical recording of an
expressed musical idea possess all of the fundamental requisites of Copyright?
16
There is no question that a musical idea per se is not copyrightable.
This is so because the rights which arise upon the formation of an idea
cannot, in fact, be protected until they take some tangible, physical
form. 17 Therefore, a need exists for the musical idea to be expressed

before it becomes the tangible which can be protected under the copyright law.' 8 The heretofore accepted means of such expression has been
written form; 19 but again the strict construction of the Constitution is
emphasized. Therefore, why not a dual construction approach?
No doubt the framers of Act I had in mind the permanence attached to a written manuscript, as well as the ease of filing. But with
today's modern innovations in the field of electronics, just as much
permanence and ease of filing are capable with a mechanical recording
as has been true of writings in the past.
Such a recording now could take several forms. One of the most
accessible types is the magnetic tape recordings. Such a tape could have
the magnetized particles that hold the sound permanently frozen in
place by electronics, in order to insure the necessary longevity of the
recording. A second form, and perhaps a more practical approach,
would be to use either musically coded spools (similar to the metal rolls
used on certain types of player pianos) or records imprinted on non20
destructible discs.
A further impetus for instituting the use of mechanical recordings
would be its help in judging the primary criteria of whether or not an
alleged author is the creator of a certain musical composition, and that
those criteria show originality. 2 1 These factors can be found in any one
of three major elements which go together to comprise a musical composition: rhythm, harmony, and melody.2 2 Would not, the recording in a
blatant infringement of another's musical work, provide almost prima
facie evidence of the alleged infringement?
Probably one of the most critical needs in the area of musical copyright, to date, is a Music-Legal Board of Experts. Such a Board would
U.S. Const., art. I, sec. 8.
Supra note 1, at 84.
17 Ibid. at 92.
18 Id. at 34.
19 White-Smith Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 17 (1907).
20 Supra note 1, at 36.
21 Northern Music Corp. v. King Record Dist. Co., 105 F. Supp. 393 (S.D. N.Y.,
1952).
15

16

22

Ibid.
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be comprised of men with solid backgrounds of knowledge in both the
law and in music. It would be the most effective and all-inclusive
approach to devising the proper legislation needed, for reviewing the
present law, and for arbitrating music-legal controversies as they arise.
Though, at first blush, this proposal seems a very ambitious one, it
nevertheless is simply a matter of following the current trend of the law
towards specialization. Just as we today have special tax courts and
labor arbitration boards, so too should the arts in general, and music in
particular, have available a skilled board of arbitrators.
No doubt, there would be many problems which would accompany
the establishment of the proposed Music-Legal Board. Although this
article will not attempt to resolve them, the problems should be brought
into the light, for all to see and ponder. What qualifications or criteria
should be used for selecting the board's members?: Should they be men
primarily with experience that is academic or professional in nature,
or a combination of the two? What rules of procedure should be used in
order to effect due process? Should the board have the power of service
by summons in order to subpoena witnesses? Should the board be
given the power to adjudicate, and if so, how should it enforce its decrees? Finally, to what extent should appeals be allowed, and to what
23
higher authority would the board be subservient?
The law of music copyright, although now quite old, is still relatively
young in its development and refinement when compared to other segments of the copyright law. The impediment in its progress is partially
due to the technicalities inherent in the discipline itself, and also to the
lack of musical sophistication on the part of most law making bodies.
Modern day electronic developments in recording and storing sound
will do much to facilitate and broaden the scope of the law. Its implementation through a Music-Legal Board of Experts could be the effective step needed in order to overcome the present shortcomings of music
copyright law.
Interview with Mr. Gary Kazdin, practicing Cleveland attorney, in Cleveland,
Ohio, May 28, 1969.
23

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol18/iss3/13

4

